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Executive	Summary	
Development aid is underperforming in terms of effectiveness due to donor diversifica-
tion, proliferation and fragmentation. The request for more harmonized and collectively 
effective actions formulated in the High-Level Fora on aid effectiveness have gained sup-
port across donor and recipient countries. However, commitment has not been successfully 
translated into significant changes on the ground. This gap between policy and country 
level practices needs to be addressed to make development assistance more effective. 
A first formal partnership of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ), Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Lux-Development (LuxDev) has 
been established in the sector of technical vocational education and training. To assess this 
partnership and to identify areas for improvement, the study addresses the following re-
search question: Under which conditions do implementing agencies in international devel-
opment cooperation enter into, develop and sustain inter-organizational collaboration? 
The dimensions of the collaboration process are at the center of the analysis. The study 
develops a theoretical framework that consists of criteria to assess collaboration efforts of 
the agencies in four selected countries and identifies weaknesses in the structural, the 
agency, and the social capital dimension. Structural aspects include common visions, 
shares power arrangements and commitment of the recipient country. Shared personal 
opinions, alignment of procedures and information exchange helps reconciling individual 
and collective interests. The analysis of the social capital dimension shows that mutual 
interaction, reciprocity and trust-building are crucial to successfully build social relation-
ships which form the basis of any collaboration process. 
A set of nine recommendations are proposed to address the shortcomings in each of the 
three dimensions of the collaboration process to improve the partnership of the three agen-
cies. To address the structural blocking factors, the agencies should evaluate their collabo-
ration efforts, create a coordinating body and speak to the recipient country’s government 
with one voice. To manage the tension between individual and collective interests, regular 
discussions with everyone involved and knowledge about the tools, procedures and imple-
menting mechanisms of the collaboration partners are crucial. To better meet the criteria of 
the social capital dimension, the agencies should appoint boundary-spanners and create 
opportunities to learn about their collaboration partners’ culture. 
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 “In following up the Declaration, we will intensify our efforts to provide and use development assistance,   
(…) in ways that rationalise the often excessive fragmentation of donor activities at the country and sector 
levels.”(OECD, 2005, p. 2) 
Chapter	1:	Introduction	
1.1	Context	and	Problem	Statement	
The concept of development aid has its roots in the context of Post-World War II, when the 
United States launched the Marshall Plan, a large-scale aid program for Europe. Today, 
official development assistance (ODA) is defined as financial aid given by governments 
and other agencies to recipient countries and multilateral institutions to support the eco-
nomic development and welfare of developing countries.1 
The effectiveness of aid has always been subject to debate and the literature provides con-
tradictory findings. On the one hand, aid flows from the members of the OECD have sig-
nificantly increased from $ 67.4 billion in 2002 to $ 156.4 billion in 2011 (OECD 2013) 
and numerous development projects and programs have contributed to the progress that has 
been made in global poverty reduction over the last decade. Scholars also find that eco-
nomic growth would be lower in the absence of aid and that aid is associated with higher 
public expenditures (McGillivray 2004). At the same time, official aid is criticized for not 
contributing to poverty reduction and economic growth and for not achieving other related 
developmental outcomes. The fast growth of emerging economies such as China and India 
causes poverty to fall more than ever before, but these countries hardly receive aid. In con-
trast, poverty is falling much slower in the main aid recipient countries. In these countries, 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be difficult to achieve. The major MDG, 
reducing the proportion of people living in extreme poverty to half by 2015, for instance, 
will not be achieved in sub-Sahara Africa until 2147 on current trends (McGillivray 2004). 
This mix of casual evidence and the absence of a correlation between aid and growth have 
made clear that in order to reach development goals, the focus has to shift from the amount 
of aid to the quality of that aid.  
                                                            
1 The DAC of the OECD defines ODA as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: 
    i.  provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and 
    ii.  each transaction of which: 
        a)  is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing coun‐
tries as its main objective; and 
        b)  is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent.” (OECD n.d.) 
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Both donor and recipient countries agree that aid is underperforming in terms of effective-
ness (Doucouliagos & Paldam 2007). Indeed, a combination of various factors lead to little 
lasting impact of aid, including donor diversification, proliferation of donor activities and 
aid fragmentation (Fengler & Kharas 2011). There has been an explosion in the number of 
donors that run an estimated 340,000 development projects around the world: 46 govern-
ments run aid programs administered through 280 bilateral development agencies, 242 
multilateral programs, 24 development banks, and about 40 United Nations agencies ( 
Deutscher & Fyson 2008). The increasing number of private foundations and the existence 
of hundreds of thousands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) add to the complexity 
(Hermias & Kharas 2008). Additionally, the involvement of emerging donors such as re-
cent members of the European Union, Middle Eastern countries, China, India, South Africa 
and Brazil increases the proportion of aid.  
With more players, aid has become less predictable, less transparent and less consistent. 
Moreover, their isolated way of working reduces the sustainability and value of the aid 
received. Problems arising from a lack of cooperation between different actors working in 
the same field are often referred to as “coordination failure”. This lack of coordination 
among donors makes it hard for recipient countries to manage aid. Deutscher and Fyson 
(2008) observed that usually 15 or more donors collectively provided less than 10 percent 
of the country’s total aid, but typically each donor required the developing country to apply 
their respective procedures and standards. Thus, given the lack of capacity at the country 
level, the number and diversity of donor policies, priorities and procedures and the lack of 
coordination create a burden for local institutions of recipient countries, weakens the local 
administrative capacity and compromises local ownership (OECD 1996). 
The need to understand why aid was not as effective as desired, led to the formulation of a 
set of principles marked by four events: the High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in 
Rome, Paris, Accra, and Busan. The breakthrough came with the Rome Conference on 
Harmonisation and Alignment in 2003, where principles for aid effectiveness were laid out 
in a concrete declaration stating that donors should alleviate the problem of low aid effec-
tiveness by coordinating their efforts, harmonizing their requirements and assisting partner 
countries in taking control of the development process. During the High-Level Forum in 
Paris in 2005, donors and recipient countries took the harmonization agenda forward by 
endorsing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, in which they commit themselves to 
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clear targets to improve aid effectiveness. Donors should support national development 
strategies (ownership); aid should be increasingly aligned with country priorities (align-
ment); donors should streamline and coordinate their efforts (harmonization); development 
policies should be directed to achieving clear goals (managing for development results); 
and donors and partner countries should be jointly responsible for achieving these goals 
(mutual accountability). The need to deepen the implementation of these goals was empha-
sized at the High-Level Forum in Accra in 2008. Improvements in the areas of ownership, 
partnerships and delivering results were proposed. The High-Level Forum in Busan in 
2011 assessed whether the progress in the aid effectiveness agenda is enough to meet the 
MDGs and to overcome global challenges in the face of the recent financial, food, security 
and climate crises (OECD 2008; OECD 2005). 
The principles agreed upon in the High-Level Fora have gained support across donor and 
recipient countries. Harmonization is on top of the aid effectiveness agenda. In order to 
arrive at more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective actions, donors should 
simplify procedures, reduce the number of separate, duplicative actions and implement 
common arrangements. Moreover, a pragmatic approach to the division of labour and bur-
den sharing increases complementarity. Donors should make use of their comparative ad-
vantage at country or sector level by delegating authority to major donors for the execution 
of activities (OECD 2005). In this regard, the European Union has assumed a leading role. 
EU member states agree that they need a common development-assistance policy, which 
requires a coordinating system as well as more efficient imlementing agencies. In 2006, the 
European Consensus for Development pressed donors to utilize common implementation 
mechanisms, joint missions and co-financing.  
To put these principles into practice strong donor commitment is needed. The Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) has formulated best practices for donor behavior in the 
areas of harmonization, alignment and ownership. According to the DAC, implementing 
agencies, those organizations responsible for the implementation of aid effectiveness poli-
cy guidelines at the country level, should harmonize their assistance, respect government 
ownership and align their activities with the priorities identified by partner countries. By 
living up to these three guidelines, donor agencies can overcome problems of proliferation, 
duplication and high transaction costs and hence make their assistance more effective.  
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In 2004, the DAC concluded that although some progress has been achieved, the commit-
ment to the harmonization and alignment agenda has not been successfully translated into 
significant changes on the ground. There is still a gap between policy and practice - be-
tween overall policy, detailed operational procedures, and country level practices. This gap 
needs to be addressed in order to successfully implement a model of development coopera-
tion based on harmonization and donor coordination (De Renzio 2005). 
1.2	Research	Question	and	Purpose		
Following the need for increased harmonization and coordination at the agency level, a 
first formal partnership of the German implementing agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the French development bank Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD) and the Luxembourgish implementing agency Lux-Development 
(LuxDev) has been established in the sector of technical vocational education and training 
(TVET)2. At the moment collaboration efforts only exist in a limited number of countries, 
thus, the representatives of the agencies feel the need to further streamline their efforts. To 
assess the collaboration of the three agencies and to identify areas for improvement, the 
study addresses the following research question:  
Under which conditions do implementing agencies in international development co-
operation enter into, develop and sustain inter-organizational collaboration? 
1.3	Scope	and	Relevance	
This study is focused on the partnership between three European implementing agencies in 
international development, GIZ, AFD and LuxDev, in the sector of TVET. Information on 
the agencies’ collaboration efforts in four selected countries, Kosovo, Burkina Faso, Vi-
etnam and Togo were collected and analyzed from the perspective of organizational theo-
ry. The results of the analysis will serve as a basis for recommendations for the implement-
ing agencies on how to improve their collaboration efforts. These recommendations will be 
presented to the representatives of each agency as well as to representatives of the respec-
tive ministries at their semi-annual meeting in Luxembourg in June 2013. Furthermore, the 
study can serve as a guideline for the staff in the TVET sector as well as in other sectors in 
countries where an increased cooperation between implementing agencies is planned. 
                                                            
2 TVET is defined, in contrast to general and academic education, as education and training which “develops 
craftsmanship, practical experience and practical problem‐solving.” (Education International 2009: 5) 
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Moreover, the study will contribute to the already existing body of knowledge in the field 
of inter-organizational collaboration. Existing literature has been criticized for theoretical 
insufficiency and lack of empirical research. Schermerhorn (1975) notes further a lack of 
additivity, i.e. scholars do not build upon existing theories and concepts. These criticisms 
imply a need for conceptual developments and empirical investigations, in particular on the 
determinants of inter-organizational cooperation. 
The study will also add to the extensive academic literature on how to improve aid effi-
ciency. Existing research in this domain is focused on coordination and harmonization on 
the international, national and ministerial level. Research on cooperation of implementing 
agencies is limited. By analyzing the collaboration efforts of three European implementing 
agencies, this study will shed light on an aspect that so far has not been examined suffi-
ciently in the academic literature.  
1.4	Structure		
The content of the thesis has been divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a theoreti-
cal and analytical basis in three steps. First, it introduces the key definitions and describes 
the applicable concepts. Second, it analyses the conditions that make collaboration possi-
ble, the process through which collaboration occurs, and the outcomes of collaboration. 
Third, it develops a multidimensional model of collaboration which focuses on criteria for 
a successful collaboration process. Chapter 3 lays out the methodology of data collection 
for the study. Chapter 4 presents the key research findings and investigates how inter-
agency collaboration in the four cases coincides with the criteria, or the lack thereof. Final-
ly, Chapter 5 and 6 make recommendations and present conclusions. 
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Chapter	2:	Theoretical	Framework	
There is little comprehensive theoretical background on the mechanisms of successful col-
laboration related to implementing agencies in international development. By collecting 
insights from the literature on organizational theory, this study developed a framework for 
the analysis of the partnership between GIZ, AFD and LuxDev. This chapter introduces the 
key definitions, describes the applicable concepts and develops a multidimensional model 
of collaboration which defines criteria for a successful collaboration process.  
2.1	Key	Definitions	and	Concepts	
2.1.1	Inter‐Organizational	Collaboration	
Among the various terms used in the literature to describe inter-agency collaboration are 
cooperation, collaborative alliance, organizational interdependence, exchange and concert-
ed decision making. This variability in terminology raises the question what the underlying 
concepts hold in common. The lowest common denominator is organizational interdepend-
ency (Schermerhorn 1975). Litwak and Hylton (1962) state that two or more organizations 
are interdependent if they take each other into account in pursuing individual goals. Other 
scholars consider purpose a further distinguishing element of interdependency. According 
to those characteristics, Gray (1991) defines collaboration as “a process through which 
parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences 
and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.” (p. 4) 
Thomson expands on Gray’s definition by including key elements from further theoretical 
perspectives, and adding the notions of governance, administration, mutuality and norms. 
She defines collaboration as “a process in which autonomous actors interact through for-
mal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relation-
ships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process 
involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions.” (Thomson & Perry 2006, p. 
23) As this encompasses various elements of a collaboration process, this definition will be 
used for the purpose of this study. 
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2.1.2	Types	of	Organizational	Relationships	
In the literature, collaboration, cooperation and coordination are often used interchangea-
bly. However, as Thomson and Perry point out, most scholars agree that coordination, co-
operation and collaboration “differ in terms of their depth of interaction, integration, com-
mitment, and complexity.” (Thomson & Perry 2006, p. 23) 
Kloth and Applegate (2004) defined five different types of organizational relationships 
(Figure 1). Organizations that do not work together are described as working independent-
ly in their own distinct boundaries following their own vision and priorities. When busi-
nesses or agencies decide that there is value in working together on common interests, they 
can enter into a coordination relationship, which allows them to maintain their boundaries 
and distinct interests. In a cooperation relationship, each organization also maintains dis-
tinct boundaries and interests. However, the difference is that each organization has an 
important part in achieving a very specific shared outcome. Collaboration is described by 
Kloth and Applegate (2004) as a relationship between organizations that aim at achieving a 
shared goal by opening their organizational boundaries enough to share information and 
practice to create synergy and alignment, thus sharing control and accountability. Finally, 
the interests of some organizations are so similar that they choose integration, which usual-
ly takes the form of a merger or acquisition. 
 
Figure 1: Working Together: A Continuum 
Source: Adapted from Kloth (2004) 
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This study uses the term collaboration to describe a general notion of working together. 
Where applicable, a differentiation according to the types of relationships by Kloth and 
Applegate will be made. 
2.1.3	Turf	Wars	
According to Wilson (1989), the struggle for turf and autonomy makes coordination be-
tween agencies very difficult. Wilson argues that high priority is attached by bureaucracies 
to autonomy or turf of the organization. Agencies are not always imperialistic, which 
means they do not always seek to maximize their size by accepting new functions and ex-
panding their budgets if it comes at the cost of losing their autonomy.  
Autonomy is defined by Philip Selznick as a “condition of independence sufficient to per-
mit a group to work out and maintain its individual identity” (as cited in Wilson 1989, p. 
182). There are two parts to this definition, external and internal autonomy. The external 
aspect of autonomy refers to independence which is equivalent to jurisdiction or domain of 
the organization. Agencies with a monopoly jurisdiction have a minimum number of rivals 
and only few political constraints imposed on them by superiors. The internal aspect of 
autonomy represents identity or mission which is defined as a shared understanding of the 
core task of the agency. When organizations have similar tasks or have to coordinate tasks, 
struggles over autonomy become especially visible. According to Wilson, turf conscious 
organizations are averse to division of labor and cooperation, because they do not want to 
share power or they fear being dominated by other agencies. Inter-agency agreements are 
viewed as threats to the autonomy of an agency. In development cooperation the variety of 
activities and the number of agencies that are active in the same field have increased. Thus, 
the opportunities for agencies to have an uncontested jurisdiction have shrunk and large 
turf problems occur.  
However, even if turf struggles make it difficult, Schermerhorn (1975) argues that inter-
agency cooperation is increasingly considered to be good and worth encouraging. In public 
services, the problem of duplicating, overlapping, and fragmentary services due to a “co-
ordination gap” between responsible agencies can be observed (Schermerhorn 1975, p. 
846). In the literature inter-agency cooperation is the suggested corrective strategy. In in-
ternational development cooperation in particular, cooperation becomes more and more 
important as donors face the challenges of an increasingly complex environment. 
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2.2	The	Antecedent‐Process‐Outcome	Model	of	Collaboration	
The literature comprises studies on the preconditions that make collaboration possible, the 
process through which collaboration occurs, and the outcomes of collaboration. In their 
review of collaboration research, Wood and Gray (1991) develop an antecedent-process-
outcome model (Figure 2). In this study, the literature on collaboration is examined for 
overlapping and commonly discussed factors. These factors are then summarized based on 
the categories proposed by Wood and Gray in the antecedent-process-outcome model. 
 
Figure 2: Antecedent-Process-Outcome Model 
Sources: Adapted from Wood & Gray (1991) and Thompson & Perry (2006) 
2.2.1	Antecedents	of	Collaboration	
Various structural conditions or actors’ motivations that give rise to collaborative alliances 
are described in the literature. The following five examples represent the main antecedents: 
a) Resources: The resource dependence perspective suggests that organizations will 
consider inter-organizational cooperation a solution when faced with scarcity of re-
sources such as funds, manpower, facilities, or information (Levine & White 1961). 
Collaboration can be a way to gain access to such resources that would otherwise 
be unavailable or to employ resources more efficiently (Schermerhorn 1975).  
b) Transaction costs: From a microeconomics perspective, the need of individual or-
ganizations to reduce transaction costs and maximize efficiency is noted as a condi-
tion under which organizations seek to enter into inter-organizational relations. In 
this case, as explained in game theory, previous experiences with efforts to collabo-
rate may influence future behavior (Axelrod 1984). 
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c) Goals: Using the approach of political theory, Roberts and Bradley (1991) claim 
that actors, that share at least one common interest, are motivated by their shared 
purpose to collaborate to achieve a common goal. Ostrom (1991) argues that actors 
are motivated to enter into collaboration by their need to protect their interests in 
common resources that may be depleted by others.  
d) Norms: The degree to which existing norms of the organization support inter-
organizational cooperative activity also influence an organization’s behavior. Evan 
(1965) suggests that positive reference points, inducing the value that cooperation 
is intrinsically good, can lead to collaboration. Baker and O’Brien (1971) speak of 
the role played by external ideological values in general in encouraging inter-
organizational cooperation. 
e) External forces: Institutional theory attributes organizations’ motivations to enter 
into collaboration to institutional environmental forces. Organizations may be in-
fluenced in their ability to establish alliances by the extent to which these relations 
are encouraged or legitimized by the external environment. Thus, demands from 
powerful extra-organizational forces including government are important motiva-
tors of collaborative alliances (Schermerhorn 1975). 
2.2.2	Outcomes	of	Collaboration	
Two competing views of the outcomes of collaboration exist in the literature. Some schol-
ars associate collaboration with negative outcomes, some identify collaboration with posi-
tive achievements. 
a) Inefficiency and free-riding: Skeptics argue that collaboration should be reduced 
to a minimum level because it leads to inefficiency and free-riding. In organization-
al economics, collaboration is noted as a condition that disturbs the functioning of 
the market because it results in inefficient allocation of resources. Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) predict that teamwork will erode because it blurs individual contri-
butions and facilitates free-riding and shrinking. Collaboration across hierarchical 
levels disguises responsibilities and invites opportunism and exploitation of asym-
metrical information and dependency.  
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b) Efficiency and trust: The majority of scholars identify collaboration with a list of 
positive outcomes. Johnson and Johnson (2001) suggested that collaborative alli-
ances, when compared with competitive actions, create higher achievement and 
productivity. Self-governing collective action can solve problems of institutional 
supply, commitment and monitoring (Ostrom 1990). A specific outcome of success-
ful collaboration is that transactions among organizations are transformed into so-
cially embedded relationships. Collaboration also enables organizations to bridge 
institutional and cultural differences, as Cohen and Mankin (2002) suggest. 
2.2.3	Process	of	Collaboration	
Collaboration scholars as well as literature on inter-organizational relations and organiza-
tional behavior strongly support an integrative view of collaboration as a process through 
which actors can use their differences to jointly solve a problem (Gray 1989, Ring & Van 
de Ven 1994).  
Wood and Grey (1991) argue that this process component of collaboration is a “black box” 
and that it is least understood. Thomson and Perry (2006) summarize the elements of the 
process component in three key dimensions: the structural dimension, the agency dimen-
sion and the social capital dimension. They emphasize that public managers must manage 
these three dimensions intentionally in order to collaborate effectively. Governance and 
administration are elements of the structural dimension, organizational autonomy describes 
the agency dimension, and mutuality and norms are part of the social capital dimension 
(Thomson et al. 2007). These dimensions allow classifying elements of collaboration pro-
cesses as explained in the literature: 
a) Governance: First of all, agencies that want to collaborate need to jointly make de-
cisions about rules that will direct their activities and relationship. The partners 
must create structures with shared power arrangements which allow to determine 
who will make decisions, which actions will be allowed, what information needs to 
be shared, and how costs and benefits will be distributed (Ostrom 1990). The di-
mension of governance implies a lack of hierarchical structure (Huxham 1996). 
Awareness, that the agencies are not only responsible for reaching an agreement but 
also need to impose decisions on themselves as well as willingness to respect the 
interests and opinions of all parties needs to be given (Gray 1989, Thomson 2001). 
The key to success is the partners’ willingness to monitor themselves and each oth-
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er. Factors that increase the likelihood of collective action are trust, reciprocity, 
communication, a shared vision and commitment to a supra-organizational goal 
(Thomson & Perry 2006). 
b) Administration: To achieve the intended goal of a collaborative alliance, an ad-
ministrative structure needs to be in place in order to transition from decision to im-
plementation of collaborative efforts. The key functions of the administration di-
mension are clarity of roles and responsibilities, coordination, concrete achievable 
goals, capacity to set boundaries, communication, and monitoring mechanisms. The 
implementation is complex, because traditional coordination mechanisms such as 
hierarchy are less feasible, and communication among the different participants is 
based more on interdependent relationships than on contracts (O'Toole 1996, Pow-
ell 1990). Thus, a central position is still necessary for coordinating communica-
tion, disseminating information, and keeping partners alert to the rules (Thomson & 
Perry 2006). Scholars agree that the key to implementing collaborative efforts is 
based on the right combination of administrative elements and the capacity to build 
relationships. Sagawa and Segal (2000), for example, advocate for the presence of 
boundary spanners, who manage and build interpersonal relationships.  
c) Autonomy: This dimension describes the need to reconcile individual and collec-
tive interests. Partners that collaborate face an intrinsic tension: They need to main-
tain their own individual organizational identities, missions and authority while at 
the same time adhering to the collaborative identity and goals (Van de Ven et al. 
1975, Wood & Gray 1991). On the one hand, organizations protect their own iden-
tities in a collaborative alliance by maintaining individual control. Shared control, 
on the other hand, involves participants’ willingness to share information about 
their organizations’ operations (Wood & Gray 1991). This tension is especially 
problematic because collaborations typically respond to problems that organiza-
tions cannot solve individually (Gray 1989, Huxham 1996), yet the missions of the 
individual organizations can create a difficult choice for the partners. When collab-
oration goals conflict with the autonomous goals of individual partner organiza-
tions, individual goals will usually trump collective goals, unless the problem is of 
sufficient urgency to all organizations and they understand the high costs of not en-
gaging in a common solution (Logsdon, 1991). 
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d) Mutuality: When organizations experience interdependence and a mutual need or 
purpose, organizations are more likely to enter inter-organizational collaboration. 
They have to experience mutually beneficial interdependencies which are based ei-
ther on differing or on shared interests and goals. Complementarity describes a sit-
uation in which “parties to a network agree to forego the right to pursue their own 
interests at the expense of others” (Powell 1990: 303). It occurs when “one party 
has unique resources that another party needs or could benefit from (and vice ver-
sa” (Thomson & Perry 2006: 27). The likelihood that partners will collaborate de-
pends on the consensus they can get out of differences based on each other’s needs. 
In contrast to complementarities, shared interests are based on homogeneity, i.e. 
commonalities among organizations such as similarity of mission or culture (Thom-
son & Perry 2006). 
e) Norms: Reciprocity is identified as a key factor for successful collaboration in the 
literature (Axelrod 1984, Powell 1990). Participants in collaboration often “demon-
strate a willingness to interact collaboratively only if their partners demonstrate the 
same willingness” (Thomson & Perry 2006: 27). This tit-for-tat reciprocity based 
on repeated interaction means that organizations accept to bear initial dispropor-
tional costs, because they expect that over time their partners will balance the dis-
tribution of costs and benefits (Axelrod 1984, Ring & Van de Ven 1994). Over 
time, as collaboration partners communicate and learn what works, elements, such 
as critical individual partner roles, may develop and form the basis of reciprocal 
exchange (Thomson & Perry 2006). 
The second element of norms is trust. Trust can be defined as a belief among indi-
viduals that their partners will make “good-faith efforts to behave in accordance 
with any commitments both explicit and implicit” (Cummings & Bromiley 1996 
cited in Yeh 2009 p. 75). Huxham and Vangen’s (2005) and Tubin and Levin-
Rozalis (2008) conclude that trust is a important component of collaboration, but it 
takes an excessive amount of time at low productivity and nurturing to establish re-
lationships and build trust. Over time,  partners can build reputation for trustworthy 
behavior and establish “psychological contracts” which allows to move from reci-
procity to longer-term commitments based on personal relationships (Ring & Van 
de Ven 1994).  
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2.3	From	Engaging	in	Collaboration	to	Developing	and	Sustaining	it	
In the literature, the collaboration process is described as a continuum of stages. Scholars 
suggests that collaboration occurs over time as organizations interact formally and infor-
mally through sequences of negotiation, development of commitments, and execution of 
those commitments. Gray’s (1989) three-phase framework, for example, involves problem 
setting, direction setting, and implementation.  
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) describe collaboration as cyclical process (Figure 3). If or-
ganizations that enter into collaboration agree on minimal expectations regarding their alli-
ance, then they will commit to an initial direction of the collaboration. If the collective 
actions are then implemented in a reciprocal fashion, the parties will continue to negotiate 
further objectives, expand their commitments and the collaboration will develop. However, 
if commitments are not executed based on reciprocity, organizations will take corrective 
measures either through renegotiating initial expectations (voice) or by reducing their 
commitment to collaborative actions (exit). Thus, collaboration evolves over time. 
 
Figure 3: Process Framework of Collaboration 
Sources: Adapted from Ring & Van de Ven (1994) and Thompson & Perry (2006) 
Ring and Van de Ven's (1994) process-oriented perspective implies that in order for col-
laboration to flourish, personal relationships, psychological contracts and informal and 
commitments need to replace organizational roles, formal agreements and legal contracts. 
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Thus, successfully sustaining collaboration over time is based on finding the right balance 
between formal organizational structures and personal relationships (Thomson & Perry 
2006). 
2.4	A	Multidimensional	Model	of	Collaboration	
Bringing together the three process dimensions of Wood and Gray’s antecedent-process-
outcome model (1991) and the cyclical description of the collaboration process by Ring 
and Van de Ven (1994), allows developing a multidimensional model of collaboration 
which includes the criteria for a successful collaboration process as well as the time dimen-
sion of the collaboration process (Table 1). The criteria in the three dimensions form the 
basis for the analysis of the research question in chapter 4. 
Table 1: Multidimensional Model of Collaboration 
 Negotiation  Commitment  Implementation  
Structural 
Dimension 
Joint decision-making about 
rules and goals, agreement 
on shared power arrange-
ments, roles, responsibili-
ties, and coordination, defi-
nition of communication 
and monitoring mechanisms 
Commitment to collective 
rules and goals, respect of 
power structures, roles, 
responsibilities and coordi-
nation, acceptance of com-
munication and monitoring 
mechanisms 
Implementation of actions 
that reflect joint decisions 
about rules and goals, ad-
hering to roles and coordi-
nation arrangements, using 
communication ad monitor-
ing mechanisms 
Agency 
Dimension 
Negotiating collective iden-
tity and goals while protect-
ing individual organization-
al identities and respecting 
individual missions 
 
Reconciling individual and 
collective interests, under-
standing the costs of not 
engaging in a shared solu-
tion and commitment to 
collective goals  
Sharing of information 
about individual organiza-
tions and following collec-
tive goals while at the same 
time maintaining individual 
organizational autonomy 
Social 
Capital 
Dimension 
Identifying mutually benefi-
cial interdependencies based 
on differing or shared inter-
est and goals, willingness to 
interact and to communicate  
Commitment to actions 
based on complementarities 
or homogeneity, long-term 
commitments based on 
reciprocity and trust 
Implementation of joint or 
complementary actions, 
reciprocal interaction, trans-
formation from reciprocity 
to psychological contracts 
Source: Self-compiled from Wood &Gray (1991) and Ring & Van de Ven (1994) 
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Chapter	3:	Methodology	
This chapter lays out the methodology of the study and explains how the research question 
will be answered, how the data was collected and analyzed. It also comments on the limita-
tions of the study.  
3.1	Research	Design	
By analyzing collaboration efforts of three implementing agencies in international devel-
opment cooperation in four selected countries, the study will identify the elements of the 
collaboration process that need to be in place in order for two or more agencies to success-
fully create and sustain a collaborative alliance. Thus, this thesis aims at answering the 
following research question: Under what conditions do implementing agencies in interna-
tional development cooperation enter into, develop and sustain inter-organizational collab-
oration? The study will not touch upon the antecedents and outcomes of the collaborations, 
but focus on the collaboration process. According to the three dimensions of the theoretical 
framework, the research has been structured into three parts: 
1. The structural dimension: Do joint governance aspects and the administrative struc-
ture of the collaboration support collaborative efforts? 
2. The agency dimension: Are individual and collective interests reconciled and does 
the structure of the agencies allow for collaboration? 
3. The social capital dimension: Do mutually beneficial interdependencies, trust and 
reciprocity exist? 
While a range of methods could have been employed for answering the research question 
posed, the exploratory nature of the study and the research logic that is “of discovery and 
not of proof” (Schmitter 2008: 7) lead to the decision to use exploratory qualitative meth-
ods of analysis and data collection. Also, the small number of cases, constraints on data 
availability as well as strong emotions and controversies incited by the topic made a con-
vincing case for the use of the exploratory qualitative method (Schmitter 2008). 
3.2	Selection	of	Cases		
The collaboration of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev in the sector of technical vocational education 
and training was selected since it is the first partnership of GIZ and other European imple-
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menting agencies that has been formalized. With the objective of improving this partner-
ship and promoting the establishment of similar partnerships in other sectors and countries, 
this example of an inter-agency collaboration was chosen.  
To identify possible case studies – already existing forms of collaboration of at least two of 
the agencies – an online survey was sent to the managers of TVET projects in 14 countries 
where a joint presence of at least two of the three agencies exists. The online survey in-
cluded basic, open-ended questions (Appendix A) that were used to throw light on the el-
ements, the success factors and the blocking factors of already existing collaborations. 
Based on the results of the online survey, collaborations in Burkina Faso, Togo, Vietnam 
and Kosovo were selected as cases. These cases represent a wide range of levels, progress 
and foci of collaboration. The willingness of the managers in charge of the projects to 
share their experiences and opinions and their availability also played a role in the selec-
tion of cases.  
3.3	Data	Gathering	Method	
Primary Data 
After the selection of case studies, qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
via telephone with managers of the selected TVET projects in Burkina Faso, Togo, Vi-
etnam and Kosovo as well as with project and country managers at headquarters of the 
three agencies. The interviews were arranged with the support of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev in 
Paris, Luxembourg and Eschborn. A pre-drafted questionnaire (Appendix B) was used as a 
broad reference to gather their insights on structural, agency and social capital dimensions 
of the collaborations.  
In accordance with the nature of the research question to explore the elements of the col-
laboration process, semi-structured interviews were chosen since they allow for the emer-
gence of new themes and have in-built flexibility of adapting to respondents’ reactions and 
of further investigating certain issues (Saunders et al. 2007). Open-ended questions were 
included in the questionnaires to elicit thoughts, perceptions, attitudes and opinions from 
the managers.  
All interviews were conducted via telephone. As outlined by Aronson (1994), the inter-
views were recorded, transcribed and in some cases translated from German or French to 
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English. In the first analysis, information shared by the interviewees was categorized into 
different themes while in the second analysis, collective themes spanning across all re-
sponses were identified. Quotations to recurrent themes were picked up from the audio 
recordings. In quoting sensitive information from the interviews, names are not provided 
due to interviewees’ requests for anonymity.  
Secondary Data 
Secondary data on the projects in four different countries was collected from internal doc-
uments of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev such as instructions, guidelines, meeting minutes and 
other documents which were made available by the managers interviewed or accessed 
through the respective websites or intranets. The study Comparison and Analysis of the 
Processes of AFD, GIZ and LuxDev (2012), an internal document of GIZ that compares 
the processes of the agencies in the field of TVET making the points in common and the 
major differences visible in order to identify where processes could be further streamlined, 
forms an important background reference document. 
Besides these internal documents, extensive literature review has been conducted includ-
ing, for instance, the EuropeAid Comparative Study of External Aid Implementation Pro-
cess (2007) of the European Commission. 
3.4	Limitations	
There are three limitations of approach and methodology. First, the primary data has its 
limitations. The responses to the questionnaire were sometimes unstructured as not all re-
spondents chose to answer all questions. Second, in context of interviews, problems of 
subjectivity and bias arose but measures were taken to eliminate them wherever possible. 
In cases where the topic under investigation involved negative experiences and opinions, 
some managers interviewed were likely to give politically correct responses. The research-
er tried to avoid this by developing a cordial rapport with the interviewees and by using 
secondary probes wherever it was necessary. Third, generalized conclusions from explora-
tory research cannot be drawn from samples to be applied to the population at large. 
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Chapter	4:	Presentation	of	Findings	
In order to embed the responses obtained from the interviewees into the organizational 
setting, the chapter will first describe the elements and the objectives of the partnership of 
GIZ, AFD and LuxDev, before presenting recurrent themes in the primary data findings 
collected through interviews with TVET managers and project managers in the field as 
well as in headquarters of GIZ, AFD and LuxDev. 
4.1	The	Partnership	of	GIZ,	AFD	and	LuxDev	in	TVET	
In 2009, a first formal partnership has been established between the German implementing 
agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the French devel-
opment bank Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the Luxembourgish imple-
menting agency Lux-Development (LuxDev) with the objective of improving their cooper-
ation in the sector of technical vocational education and training.   
The partnership has been set up to increase aid effectiveness through harmonization and 
coordination in the TVET sector. The partners are able to co-finance projects, use com-
plementarities and strengthen synergies along the interventions. Such collaboration enables 
the governments of the recipient countries to deal with less coordination cycles, lower 
transaction costs, and fewer contact persons. The collaboration will also result in more 
effectiveness which in turn leads to better results and impacts. Moreover, the partnership 
makes more financial and technical volume available and allows for sector-wide and sec-
tor-deep approaches.  
The collaboration was initiated in 2005, when GIZ and AFD started to exchange infor-
mation, to conduct joint studies and to set up regular meetings. The partnership was 
strengthened in 2009, when LuxDev joined the alliance and a trilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on a partnership in TVET was signed. Concrete collaboration on 
project level in selected countries started in 2011 (GIZ, AFD & LuxDev 2011, 2012, 
2013). 
A joint presence of AFD and LuxDev in the TVET sector can be found in Burkina Faso 
and Niger. AFD and GIZ carry out TVET projects in Algeria, Congo, Ivory Coast, South 
Africa, Vietnam and Togo. GIZ and LuxDev have a joint presence in Kosovo, Montenegro 
and Namibia and in Laos, Mali and Senegal all three agencies are active (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Joint Presence 
Source: Self-compiled based on internal documents 
In these 14 countries, the level of collaboration differs significantly. It ranges from a min-
imum level of collaboration, including information exchange and regular meetings, to a 
high level of collaboration, where a project is co-financed by two or more agencies (Figure 
5). A delegation of funds is currently not possible, because it is conditional upon a mutual 
recognition of procedures that does not exist between the three agencies under the existing 
circumstances. 
 
Figure 5: Levels of Collaboration 
Source: Self-compiled based on interviews 
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4.2	Analysis	of	the	Selected	Cases	Using	the	Multidimensional	Model	
Co-financing in Burkina Faso, a formal partnership in Kosovo, collaboration at the imple-
menting level in Vietnam and information exchange in Togo were selected as cases for this 
study because they represent a diversity of levels, progress and foci of collaboration. The 
following table presents an overview of the collaboration efforts, the objectives and the 
current status (Table 2). 
Table 2: Collaborations in Burkina Faso, Kosovo, Vietnam and Togo 
 Co-financing in 
Burkina Faso  
Formal Partner-
ship in Kosovo  
Collaboration at 
the implementing 
level in Vietnam  
Information Ex-
change in Togo  
Agencies 
involved  
AFD, LuxDev  LuxDev, GIZ  AFD, GIZ  GIZ, AFD  
Objectives  Financing a sector 
policy support pro-
gram which sup-
ports the National 
fund for TVET 
Strengthening the 
performance of the 
TVET system fol-
lowing the Kosovo 
Education Sector 
Plan  
Coordination of two 
separate projects to 
support a technical 
training center in 
becoming a Center 
of Excellence for 
TVET  
Joint assessment 
and preparation of a 
new TVET program 
Activities  • Joint support to 
the government 
of Burkina Fa-
so in designing 
and implement-
ing a national 
TVET strategy 
• Financing of 
activities with-
in this strategy 
 
• Joint provision 
of advisory 
services to the 
ministry  
• Support in the 
development of 
sector-specific 
training centers  
LuxDev: 
• Supporting the 
training centers 
with technical 
and financial 
assistance 
GIZ: 
• Development 
the conceptual 
framework of 
the national 
GIZ: 
• Development 
of the center’s 
conceptual 
framework 
• Support in the 
development of 
occupational 
profiles 
• Implementation 
of training for 
teaching staff 
AFD: 
• Support in the 
development of 
occupational 
profiles 
• Provision of 
• Joint assess-
ment and prep-
aration of the 
program  
• Discussions 
and infor-
mation ex-
change during 
three missions 
to Togo 
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TVET reform  workshops and 
equipment 
Reasons to 
collaborate  
Increase of the 
financial force, the 
political voice and 
the visibility of the 
project  
Harmonization and 
alignment of the 
agencies’ activities 
under the leadership 
of the ministry 
Division of labor to 
avoid overlapping 
activities and in-
vestments in the 
same occupational 
profiles  
Interest in the aid 
effectiveness agen-
da  
Current 
status 
Implementation 
phase:  
 Implementation 
of collective 
actions  
Commitment phase:  
 No implemen-
tation of com-
mitments in a 
reciprocal fash-
ion 
 
Commitment and 
implementation 
phase:  
 Start of execu-
tion of com-
mitments in a 
reciprocal fash-
ion 
Negotiation phase:  
 Discussion of 
expectations 
regarding col-
lective action 
Source: Self-compiled from primary data collected through interviews and internal documents 
This study analyzes each of these cases according to the multidimensional model of collabora-
tion developed in chapter 2. It does not take into account variations in the negotiation, col-
laboration and implementation factors described by Ring and Van de Ven (1994), instead 
focuses on the criteria for a successful collaboration process described by Wood and Gray 
(1991):  
1. The structural dimension: Do joint governance aspects and the administrative struc-
ture of the collaboration support collaborative efforts? 
2. The agency dimension: Are individual and collective interests reconciled and does 
the structure of the agencies allow for collaboration? 
3. The social capital dimension: Do mutually beneficial interdependencies, trust and 
reciprocity exist? 
Based on the primary data collected through interviews, collective themes spanning across 
all responses were identified and categorized into the aforementioned dimensions. The 
following sub-chapters will analyze the collaboration process by answering these questions 
for each of the four cases. 
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4.3	Co‐financing	in	Burkina	Faso	
In Burkina Faso, AFD and GIZ are co-financing a sector policy support program which 
supports the National fund for TVET (FAFPA). The collaboration is characterized by joint 
decision-making, clear roles and responsibilities, formalized communication, willingness 
to share information and to adopt common procedures, complementary elements and posi-
tive personal relationships. Blocking factors, such as different visions and approaches as 
well as unequal power structures, remain. 
Structural Dimension 
a) Joint decision-making: United by the shared goal of supporting the vocational 
training sector, the two agencies jointly made decisions on vision, goals, and rules 
that direct their activities and relationship. Managers from headquarters as well as 
representatives of the agencies in Burkina Faso took part in the negotiations of an 
initial course of action. The working group also jointly designed the new project 
and developed a political strategic framework that made it possible to co-finance 
the implementation: “We worked through the design phase together, and that’s of 
course a very interesting exercise because it obliges to have the same vision and the 
same priorities and the same discussions and the same diplomatic voice towards the 
local government.” (Interview 1) 
b) Clear roles and responsibilities: The roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. 
Each agency signed a specific bilateral financial agreement with the government of 
Burkina Faso and all signed an agreement which describes the elements of the col-
laboration. Individual roles are also clearly defined. The project managers of AFD 
and LuxDev at the offices in Ouagadougou are in charge of monitoring the progress 
of the implementation. The sectoral experts in the head offices in Paris and Luxem-
bourg are also involved. Since Luxemburg has been designated head of donors, the 
project manager of LuxDev in the field has a coordinating role. He organizes 
monthly meetings and disseminates information. 
c) Formalized communication: The communication between all agencies is formal-
ized. The steering committee, which includes the Ministry for Vocational Training 
of Burkina Faso and all donors involved, meet once a month. Outside of these 
meetings there is an effective communication between both the managers of AFD 
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and LuxDev in the field as well as the sectoral experts at headquarters. As a repre-
sentative of LuxDev states “The project manager in Burkina Faso is on top of it and 
he coordinates with the partner from AFD. The sectoral experts are at headquarters, 
a little bit more distant, but I do think that there is a good communication between 
all actors.” (Interview 1) The steering committee acts as a central position for coor-
dinating communication, disseminating information, and keeping partners alert to 
the rules.  
d) Different visions and approaches: Even if the negotiation of a collaborative 
course of action was successful, different visions and approaches on empowering 
the government of Burkina Faso remain. Both agencies want to ensure that the gov-
ernment takes ownership of the project and that the Ministry of Vocational Training 
of Burkina Faso takes the lead in the decision-making and implementation process. 
In this regard, the approach of one of the agencies is seen as more straight forward, 
because it puts more pressure on the government than the other donors. “In the end 
we still have different visions on development.” (Interview 1)  
e) Unequal power structure: Another structural aspect is the unequal power ar-
rangement that has been criticized by the persons interviewed. Luxembourg has 
been designated coordinator and leader of the group of donors. This means the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg is the Head of Donors and leads the dis-
cussions and acts as an interface between government of Burkina Faso and the 
partners. However, it seems that not every donor has the same power in the discus-
sion: “You might say that every donor has one voice, in theory yes, but it might be 
a little bit stronger from one donor to another donor.” (Interview 1) The fact that 
one donor has the leading role may lead to biased decisions: “It’s kind of difficult; 
it is biased if a head of donors is representing one donor. Then this head of donors 
will maximize the benefits for his own donor and not for the others.” (Interview 1)  
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Agency Dimension 
f) Willingness to align procedures: Regarding the success of reconciling individual 
and collective identities and goals, a willingness to align procedures can be ob-
served. As this is a sector policy support program, the agencies align with the na-
tional procedures of the government. This means they simply follow one procedure, 
instead of many donor-specific procedures, with the exception of LuxDev that still 
uses some of its procedures to contract consultants for example. 
g) Different structure of the agencies: However, the difference in approaches can 
create difficulties, in a sense that AFD as a development bank is more focused on 
inputs and controls the local partner in every step whereas LuxDev as an imple-
menting agency is more focused on the outputs and gives the local partner more 
freedom. According to an interviewee, “everyone has his kind of priorities, AFD is 
a bank so they are very much into the budgeting and in the input, whereas Luxem-
burg is a development cooperation agency, meaning they look much more at the re-
sults at the end, not so much at the inputs and that is a big difference.” (Interview 1) 
 
h) Individual interest: Also, individual interests could still block the collaboration. 
The agencies defend their own interests, priorities and goals which often make de-
cision-making a lengthy process, because agreements have to be accepted by eve-
ryone. “All these donors are coming in with their background, with all their wishes 
and needs and I must say it is not that easy.” (Interview 1) Nevertheless, the agen-
cies understand the problem and the joint vision and are committed to achieve the 
collective goals.  
Social Capital Dimension 
i) Complementarities: According to the interviewees the collaboration works well 
because there is a real complementarity. For example, LuxDev has a lot of tech-
nical staff at the national level in Burkina Faso managing different projects and 
programs. They are much more involved in the implementation of the programs, 
than AFD which operates through the national services. “So I would say that com-
plementarity of approach was useful for the progress of the program.” (Interview 2) 
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j) Positive interaction: There are positive personal relationships both at headquarters 
and in the field. The attitudes and behaviors of the persons involved impact the 
agencies’ ability to collaborate in an efficient way. “We need the people, people 
with a good vision. If you have people that just think about unilateral projects then 
of course you cannot move ahead. You need to have another mentality, another set 
of ideas. We have them, that is good.” (Interview 1) 
Conclusion 
In Burkina Faso two structural aspects could lead to difficulties in the collaboration pro-
cess: Different visions and approaches, for example on empowering the government of 
Burkina Faso, can block consensus building while unequal power arrangements within the 
steering committee can lead to biased decisions. 
	
4.3	Formal	Partnership	in	Kosovo	
In Kosovo, there is no sector policy support program in place as in Burkina Faso, but 
LuxDev and GIZ agreed to harmonize and align their activities under the leadership of the 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) to avoid overlapping of interna-
tional donor contribution. The collaboration in Kosovo fulfills some of the criteria of suc-
cessful collaboration, such as joint decision-making and regular communication. Other 
factors, such as information exchange and interaction, need to be improved in order to 
achieve the common goals. 
Structural Dimension 
a) Joint decision-making: GIZ and LuxDev jointly decided on the goals for the col-
laboration between GIZ, LuxDev and the MEST which has been formalized 
through a Memorandum of Understanding. They agreed to design and implement 
separate projects that are interconnected in order to follow their own interests while 
at the same time benefiting from complementarities.  
b) Regular communication: At the moment the two agencies are having bi-weekly 
meetings, which include a minimum of information exchange. They „meet infor-
mally on an irregular basis to talk about the project and have regular meetings to 
exchange information and document these meetings. I would say we have the same 
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opinion on donor coordination.“ (Interview 7) The agencies talk about their ap-
proaches regarding teacher training, teaching material development and partner-
ships with the private sector. (Interview 8) However, there are severe disagree-
ments on fundamental issues. 
c) Different opinions on essential issues: In some areas, such as partnerships be-
tween companies and training centers, a high degree of consensus exists. On specif-
ic questions, however, the representatives of the two agencies have different opin-
ions on essential issues concerning the TVET system in Kosovo. There is a disa-
greement, for example, on the topic of the development of a coordinating agency 
for the TVET sectors, as one manager puts it: “I regret that the project manager had 
a different opinion and that is of course not very positive for the collaboration.” (In-
terview 7)  
d) Disagreements on tools and processes: Another problem is that tools and pro-
cesses of one agency are not necessarily known or recognized by the other agency. 
This can lead to disagreements and delays in implementation. Usually, the Memo-
randum of Understanding defines which processes and tools are used, but disa-
greements might still arise because one agency is not used to adhering to certain 
principles or using specific tools. “ The MoU defines what we do and how we do it, 
this means the processes are fixed and one could expect that both partners imple-
ment the activities along the rules of the MoU.“ (Interview 7)  
Agency Dimension 
e) Lack of willingness to exchange information: The lack of willingness to ex-
change information shows that the agencies do not achieve to reconcile their indi-
vidual and the collective interests. The agencies are not willing to disclose certain 
information. “Sometimes it is really exchange of information and nothing more, or 
even less. I feel lack of providing all information to the project.” (Interview 8) Pro-
tecting their own interests leads also to ignoring or bypassing the other agency in 
the decision-making or implementation process on both sides. Both agencies de-
mand more transparency and consultation, for example with regard to meetings 
with the local partners: “We plan to support the school with an instrument called 
“Entwicklungspartnerschaft”. In this context I would like to see more transparency. 
The project manager should, for example, inform us when he meets the local com-
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munities.“ (Interview 7) They also feel that there are too many “unilateral moves 
and decisions (…), which can embarrass and surprise sometimes the cooperation 
partners” (Interview 8) or that agencies keep “silent on certain issues, activities, de-
velopments from utmost importance for the further development in VET, and use 
easier cooperation partners for implementing the own agenda.” (Interview 8)  
f) Disagreements within the agencies: There are not only disagreements between the 
two cooperation partners, but also within one agency between the project managers 
on the one side and regional and sectoral experts at headquarters on the other side. 
„An opinion on a content-related question is not regulated in a contract. The expert 
in the field is free to defend his or her own opinion.” (Interview 5) This leads also 
to disagreements and unilateral moves, which leads to confusion in the ministry: 
„The different opinions of LuxDev and GIZ in the field also divide the ministry.“ 
(Interview 5) The interviewees feel that „this is very dangerous, because such dif-
ferent views can create confusion among the local partners.“ (Interview 7)  
Social Capital Dimension 
g) Lack of willingness for a mutual collaboration: Since the interests and funda-
mental concepts of each agency are so far apart, working on the same objectives is 
not possible, because not even a decision based on complementarities can be 
reached. Both managers in the field feel a lack of willingness for mutual collabora-
tion and agreements that are based on mutually respected inputs from the other 
agency.  
h) Difficult interaction: Building relationships based on reciprocity and trust is very 
difficult, because the project managers have differing personal opinions and profes-
sional views which create a tension between the two agencies: „They agree on the 
broad framework. However, their opinions on thematic issues are so far apart that 
this also affects their personal interaction. They do not meet over a coffee as often 
as others that get along very well.” (Interview 5)  
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Conclusion 
The formalized collaboration in Kosovo is severely blocked due to weaknesses in the 
agency and social capital dimensions. Different personal visions and opinions on funda-
mental questions, as well as different implementing mechanisms and tools, hinder the will-
ingness for mutual interaction, reciprocity and trust-building which negatively affects so-
cial relationships and the willingness to exchange information. 
	
4.4	Collaboration	at	the	Implementing	Level	in	Vietnam	
In Vietnam, AFD and GIZ coordinate two separate projects to support a technical training 
center (LILAMA 2) in becoming a Center of Excellence for TVET by offering demand-
oriented vocational training in selected occupations following international standards. In 
order to avoid duplicative activities and investments in the same occupational profiles, the 
agencies divided up the domains and follow this division of labor during the design and 
implementation of their activities. Joint decision-making, clearly defined roles, coordina-
tion through meetings and information exchange as well as the commitment to collective 
goals have been identified as success factors of the collaboration. However, the division of 
labor prevents the agencies from collaborating more closely, thus they are managing their 
projects in an autonomous way using their own procedures and mechanisms. 
Structural Dimension 
a) Joint decision-making: Before the two projects commenced, GIZ and AFD con-
ducted a joint project appraisal mission in Vietnam. The representatives of the 
agencies discussed their overall project concepts and implementation details with 
representatives of the college’s management and of the ministries involved. “Each 
institution will have its own project but there has been a significant effort to make 
sure there is as much coordination as possible and that there is no overlapping.” (In-
terview 9) The agencies agreed on parallel financing with common vision, objec-
tive and ends, despite different means. For two years the two projects have been in 
the design phase and during that phase there was a constant consultation and joint 
discussions on a conceptual framework in order to reduce overlapping activities and 
to divide the domains in a reasonable way. According to the project managers, “the 
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challenge is to have the best coordination during the preparation of the project and 
then we will enter into the implementation of the project.” (Interview 9)  
b) Clearly defined roles: The roles of the two agencies are clearly defined. AFD sup-
ports five TVET institutions and works on specific domains in each of these institu-
tions. One of these schools is also targeted by GIZ. So it has been decided that each 
agency will focus on specific domains. However, as GIZ is an implementing agen-
cy and AFD is a development bank, they do not play the same role. The most im-
portant difference is that AFD is financing the government of Vietnam to imple-
ment the project, whereas GIZ implements itself the project. (Interview 9)  
c) Formalized communication: The project managers and their teams meet once or 
twice a year in Vietnam to exchange information. Often the project manager from 
headquarters, in the case of AFD as well as some consultants who work on the im-
plementation of the projects, take part in those meetings. The interviews made clear 
that both agencies understand the importance of collaborating and are committed to 
the collective goal and vision. However, there are some factors that block a more 
intensive collaboration. 
d) Lack of commitment from the local government: Most importantly, the lack of 
willingness from the government of Vietnam to combine the projects reduced the 
agencies’ ability to work together more closely. According to the project managers, 
the best way to collaborate would have been a single project co-financed by both 
agencies. Unfortunately, that has not been possible, because the government of Vi-
etnam does not want to organize a joint project, but prefers to have two separate 
projects instead, in order to receive more funds. “I think the government has a strat-
egy to have several partners (…) So it is not the highest level, unfortunately. But 
there has been a very significant willingness to coordinate as much as possible.” 
(Interview 9) 
Agency Dimension 
e) No alignment of procedures and no systematic exchange of information: The 
division of labor makes it easy for the two agencies to follow a common goal while 
still adhering to their individual interests and following their own procedures and 
ways of working. There is no overlap which needs to be discussed and the projects 
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are in different stages of the design and implementation process. Thus, even if there 
is a willingness to communicate, information is only exchanged on demand and not 
yet in an automatic and systematic way (Interview 7). 
Social Capital Dimension 
f) Complementarities: The collaboration is based on a shared vision and goals but 
the actions are designed and implemented separately, because the two agencies in-
vest in different domains at the same training center. The two projects are similar in 
their content but not in their form. A big difference is that GIZ contracts consult-
ants who work as technical assistants directly at the center LILAMA 2 and imple-
ment the project there, whereas the consultants financed by AFD work on five dif-
ferent centers, so they rather provide advice and consult the center on how to im-
plement the elements of the project. The fact that AFD as a development bank and 
GIZ as an implementing agency do not use the same implementation mechanisms 
explains this difference: “There are some differences because AFD is a bank using 
consultants to implement a project. In contrast, GIZ is an implementing agency that 
has different offices in the countries and the employees oversee the implementation 
of the project.“ (Interview 4)  
g) Professional relationships: Both agencies design and implement two separate pro-
jects, but work closely together to avoid overlapping activities. The relationships of 
everyone involved were described as very professional: “Each time the teams in 
Vietnam meet regularly and each time there is a supervision meeting from Paris. 
During my mission the discussion was very open.” (Interview 9)  
Conclusion 
In Vietnam, to avoid overlapping activities and investments in the same occupational pro-
files, the agencies agreed on a division of labor and the coordination of two separate pro-
jects to support a technical training center. The problems that arise are of a structural na-
ture. The lack of willingness from the government of Vietnam to combine both projects 
prevents a more effective collaboration. Hence, even if the agencies share a common goal, 
they still design and implement their projects independent of each other using their own 
procedures. Also, a systematic and extensive exchange of information does not take place. 
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4.5	Exchange	of	Information	in	Togo	
Both GIZ and AFD prepare a new program in Togo. AFD has been active in the country 
for a long time and is now implementing a new program which supports an industrial train-
ing center and three technical advocacy centers as well as the national training fund. The 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) only recent-
ly decided to start activities in Togo, so GIZ is designing a new program in the field of 
TVET. The fact that both organizations are at the beginning of the project cycle makes it 
easy for them to collaborate. Thereby, GIZ and AFD are now jointly assessing and prepar-
ing a new technical cooperation program in Togo. The collaboration so far has been de-
scribed as very positive.  
Structural Dimension 
a) Agreement on an initial course of action: Since the collaboration has just begun, 
the agencies have not yet decided on specific goals. Employees from GIZ head-
quarters visited Togo on three different occasions to identify sectors and primary 
schemes of the project and on these occasions they met with the project manager 
from AFD. “Now I am waiting that things are starting from their side to work 
closely with them. I have a kind of idea what they want to do but I don’t have a 
concrete idea, because I don’t think they already have it. They need more studies 
and preparation of the projects before knowing exactly what the projects will look 
like.” (Interview 6) 
b) Shared vision: At the moment AFD is still focused on its project and the manager 
in the office in Ouagadougou is waiting for GIZ to become operational. GIZ sent a 
manager to the field who is now setting up the project. Both agencies have a joint 
vision, they agreed, as a first step, to set up a sector group on vocational training 
and jointly discuss with the government of Togo on the topic of training reforms 
and other public policy questions. So there is a shared understanding of the objec-
tives and a well-defined division of labor (Interview 3).  
c) Joint Steering Committee: The agencies agreed that a joint steering committee 
will be set up to decide on joint activities. The activities of the steering committee 
will also be monitored: “In the beginning we do not discuss in detail which moni-
toring mechanisms we will use, but if a joint steering committee is set up, it is clear, 
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that the work of the committee will be monitored and we will decide on appropriate 
monitoring arrangements.“ (Interview 3) 
d) Commitment of the government unclear: The agencies agreed on a common 
framework for the project but they have not begun the conversation with the gov-
ernment of Togo. According to the sectoral expert, the approval of the ministries is 
crucial for the success of the project and could be a potential risk: „The Togolese 
ministries have to be involved. We intent to set up a joint steering committee, but it 
is unclear if the Togolese accept this and want to be involved in this. We can moti-
vate and convince them, but of course we cannot decide for them.“ (Interview 3) 
e) Commitment of consultants unclear: Another risk potentially lies with the fact 
that AFD, in line with its internal procedure, has subcontracted the implementation 
of its Togo program to a consulting firm. This firm may not feel the same commit-
ment to the cooperation as the local AFD office and AFD headquarter. In the terms 
of reference of the experts the partnership will be mentioned and specified, howev-
er, the manager at headquarters states that a contract cannot influence the willing-
ness to collaborate and to build relationships, so the commitment of the experts re-
mains unclear. „We do not know whether the consulting firm, that wins the con-
tract, will be willing to implement all this, if it is not part of the terms of reference. 
This is a risk, that we in Germany cannot influence.“ (Interview 3) 
Agency Dimension 
f) Willingness to share information: The partners understand the advantages in en-
gaging in a shared solution and are willing to respond to the requirements of other 
organizations in order to make collaboration successful. A strong willingness to 
share information about their own organizations’ operations and about what they 
can contribute to the collaboration can be observed: “For the moment I have all the 
information and I don’t think they have more than what I have. So they are still in 
the process of identifying the projects. And I think the next step will be for them to 
present exactly the projects and the other step is to set up some people on the field 
and then we will work together closely on a daily basis.” (Interview 6) 
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g) Flexibility to reconcile individual and collective interests: There seems to be 
great flexibility, because both agencies are starting a new program. They are able to 
incorporate changes and adaptations right from the beginning. The project manager 
emphasizes, that “from our side we are flexible and we will adapt to try to maxim-
ize the collaboration.” (Interview 6) 
Social Capital Dimension 
h) Complementarities: On the one hand, the interests of the agencies are complemen-
tary. They divided some sectors according to their strengths and approaches. On the 
other hand there is also an interface where the interests and priorities overlap. A di-
vision of labor might therefore be likely. Both agencies set up their projects in order 
to avoid overlap but to complement the activities of the other organization. Specific 
areas for each agency have been defined and interfaces identified. 
i) Positive personal interaction: The personal relationships are described as very 
positive. There is trust and transparency on both sides. Both agencies show interest 
in the aid effectiveness agenda and in a common objective of collaborating in order 
to increase their impact. However, since the project is still in the initial phase, dis-
cussions and joint meetings are necessary in order to strengthen these relationships. 
According to the sectoral expert, „the broad framework has been agreed upon. Now 
the people in the field have to get along. One step is the planning phase where the 
intentions and directions are clarified, but how these decisions will be implemented 
really depends on the willingness of the people in the field.” (Interview 3)  
j) Risk of difficult personal relationships: As parts of the project will be imple-
mented by consultants, the risk could be due to consultants’ personal relationships 
with employees from the other agencies if that does not work. The expert states that 
“it is not only an institutional but also a personal issue. Personal relationships are 
per se a risk. If people do not get along very well, then they will not approach each 
other. They will do their duty, but this will not lead to a long-term collaboration 
based on trust.“ (Interview 3)  
 
 
  Chapter	4:	Presentation	of	Findings	
 
 
Conclusion 
In Togo the two agencies are at the beginning of a new project cycle, so they are jointly 
assessing and preparing a new program. The collaboration so far has been described as 
very positive. There are some external factors that are still unclear. The Togolese govern-
ment could block the collaboration efforts. Also, the consulting firm which will implement 
parts of the project will have to be committed to the collective goals. However, everyone 
involved agrees, that if the intentions are put into practice, the results promise to be very 
beneficial and Togo has the potential to become a model for an initiative of the partnership 
of AFD, GIZ and LuxDev.  
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4.6	Synthesis	of	Findings	
The analysis of the four cases shows that certain criteria of the three dimensions of the col-
laboration process are fulfilled more easily than others depending on the particular situa-
tion (Table 3).  
Table 3:  Elements of the Collaboration Process in Burkina Faso, Kosovo, Vietnam 
and Togo 
Dimensions Criteria 
Burkina 
Faso Kosovo Vietnam Togo 
Governance Joint decision-making + + + + 
Shared power arrange-
ments -   
+ 
Shared vision - - + 
Commitment of local 
government/ consultants
  
- - 
Administration Clear roles and responsi-
bilities +  
+ 
 
Formalized communica-
tion + + +  
Agency Reconciling individual 
and collective interests - -  
+ 
Alignment of procedures + - 
 
Information exchange - - + 
Coherence within one 
agency  
- 
  
Mutuality Interdependencies - + 
 
Complementarities + + 
 
Norms Interaction + - + + 
Source: Self-compiled from primary data collected through interviews 
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Structural aspects, such as different visions and approaches and unequal power arrange-
ments in Burkina Faso, can inhibit consensus building or lead to biased decisions. External 
factors can also affect the collaboration structure negatively. For instance, the lack of will-
ingness of the government of Vietnam to unite both projects blocks a more intensive col-
laboration. 
Furthermore, shortcomings in the agency dimension can severely block collaboration ef-
forts as the examples of Kosovo and Vietnam demonstrate. The failure to reconciling indi-
vidual and collective interests in Kosovo due to different personal visions or the usage of 
individual procedures and the lack of information exchange in Vietnam prevent both agen-
cies from benefitting from complementarities or interdependencies. 
Finally, the case of Kosovo shows that the social capital dimension is crucial. The willing-
ness for mutual interaction, reciprocity and trust-building must be given in order to suc-
cessfully build social relationships which form the basis of any collaboration process. 
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From the above analysis, it is concluded that the blocking factors of a successful collabora-
tion in the four cases can be categorized into three dimensions: the structural, the agency 
and the social capital dimension of the collaboration process. Thomson and Perry (2006) 
argue that, even if collaboration is hard to realize, public managers should negotiate with 
collaboration partners across the three dimensions to allow for trial-and error learning. This 
chapter presents recommendations for each dimension that address the current weaknesses 
of the partnership. 
5.1	The	Structural	Dimension		
In order to strengthen joint governance and administrative collaboration structures: 
1. Collaboration efforts should be evaluated: According to Daley (2008), the key to 
success of the decisions that govern collective action rests in the agencies’ willing-
ness to monitor themselves and each other. Neither LuxDev nor AFD nor GIZ 
evaluated their adherence to the jointly determined rules. Regular discussions on 
the progress of the collaboration efforts take place at the meetings of the sectoral 
experts at headquarters and at the meetings of the project managers in the field, but 
formal monitoring mechanisms are absent. Only in Kosovo, an analysis of the col-
laboration and a follow-up on the MoU by a commission from Luxembourg is 
planned (Interview 7). 
Ideally, an evaluation of the collaborative activities should be conducted regularly 
and jointly by both agencies. Without evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, joint 
decision-making is unlikely and the ability to build credible commitment is lost 
(Thomson and Perry 2006). The twelve indicators of the Paris Declaration could be 
used as a basis for an analysis of collaboration efforts of development agencies (In-
terview 1). Sharing the results with all parties involved guarantees a maximum of 
transparency and allows for meaningful feedback and improvements. 
 
2. A coordinating body should be created: In a collaborative structure, it is crucial 
to establish a central position which keeps partners alert to the agreed-upon rules, 
coordinates communication and disseminates information (Freitag & Winkler 2001, 
McGuire 2006). In Burkina Faso, the joint steering committee fulfills this role, but, 
at the same time, this leads to unequal power arrangements. In other countries, such 
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as Kosovo and Vietnam, it would be up to the local ministries to take a coordinat-
ing role, but they hesitate, because they prefer to keep all donors separate in order 
to receive more funds (Interview 8).  
Therefore, creating an independent coordinating mechanism or appointing a facili-
tator that does not submit itself to any political interests would be the optimal op-
tion. This person or body should streamline different wishes and needs, make sure 
that each party can express their opinions freely and lead the group to a consensus. 
In Burkina Faso, this can result a shared power arrangement where “every voice 
counts.” (Interview 1) In Kosovo, this can help the parties agree on an approach 
and reach a consensus on fundamental questions. 
 
3. The agencies should speak to the local government with one voice: According 
to the interviewees, “it is difficult to speak the same language and send to all exter-
nal partners and parties one message.” (Interview 8) Therefore, the agencies should 
jointly approach the local partner institutions and present their common strategy. 
This avoids delivering different messages which lead to confusion among the part-
ner institutions. A single point of communication gives the agencies a stronger po-
sition in the negotiations with the local government. Sending a coherent message to 
the embassies and the ministries in Germany, Luxemburg and France as well as to 
partners in the private sector is equally important. 
	
5.2	The	Agency	Dimension		
In order to manage the tension between individual and collective interests: 
4. Regular discussions with all parties involved should be organized: In cases, 
such as in Kosovo, where individual interests block information exchange and the 
commitment to collective goals, all parties involved should meet regularly to dis-
cuss the aspects of the project. The managers do not only want to meet „ just one 
person to talk about the modalities, but everyone involved. And once we take a de-
cision in these meetings, everyone should stick to it. I suggest that the different re-
sponsibilities and meta levels should be brought together.“ (Interview 7) These 
meetings should include all levels involved, for example project managers, country 
managers, regional experts and sectoral experts. Missions from headquarters to the 
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respective countries should be organized at the same time, so that these discussions 
can take place during those missions (Interview 5). The meetings should serve as a 
forum to set the principles and develop a long-term vision which serves as a com-
mon, guiding framework for the collaboration in the respective country. While 
some agencies may still continue to design and implement projects based on their 
expertise and division of labor, they will be organized under common objectives 
and goals, minimizing turf wars by establishing common priorities and targets. The 
interviewees agreed that it would be helpful “to meet with everyone who has a say 
and to set the content-related principles of the collaboration, meaning what are the 
joint actions and where do we support each other.“ (Interview 5)  
 
5. Learning about tools, implementation mechanisms and procedures of the 
partner agencies should be facilitated: The project managers need to learn about 
the tools, procedures and implementation mechanisms of the partner agencies in the 
field in order to better understand the decisions and approaches of the other agen-
cies (Hocevar et al. 2011). This could be achieved through workshops at the partner 
agencies or by distributing a document which compares the processes of each of the 
three agencies. The exchange of staff, as described in point 7, could also contribute 
to a better understanding of the mechanisms and tools used by the collaboration 
partners. A better knowledge of their partners’ way of working in general would 
make it easier to come to a consensus regarding the alignment of procedures and 
the joint use of certain tools and could help reconciling individual and collective in-
terests.  
	
5.3	The	Social	Capital	Dimension		
In order to strengthen mutually beneficial interdependencies and norms of trust and reci-
procity: 
6. Boundary-spanners should be appointed: The key to successful collaboration 
rests in the right combination of administrative and social capacity. Therefore, the 
coordinating body which ensures that collaboration requirements are met should be 
augmented by boundary-spanning roles. Boundary spanners are individuals who 
manage and build inter-organizational relationships, mediate among contested 
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power structures and manage interdependency (Schermerhorn 1975). An independ-
ent consultant, paid by all agencies, could fulfill this role.  
Nonetheless, boundary-spanning responsibilities may not rest in a single individual 
but instead should be part of any manager’s competencies (Radin 1996). In the ab-
sence of an independent facilitator, necessary competencies and abilities, such as 
conflict-management skills, should be considered when recruiting individuals in-
volved in collaborative alliances.  
 
7. Opportunities to learn about partner agencies’ culture should be increased: In 
some cases, different opinions on fundamental questions block attempts to collabo-
rate. In other cases, a relatively fast job rotation prevents long-term relationships. 
Some individuals know their collaboration partner in the other agency only from 
conversations via phone or email (Interview 5). In such an environment it is very 
difficult to build social relationships based on reciprocity and trust. To counter 
these developments it is crucial to gain an understanding of the other agency’s cul-
ture (Hocevar et al. 2011). Joint meetings are a good opportunity to get to know the 
people of the other organizations as well as their visions and methods of working. 
At the beginning of a new collaboration a mutual briefing of the core staff should 
take place (Interview 3). Moreover, representatives of all agencies could be invited 
to events or workshops on specific topics organized by one of the agencies or the 
agencies could jointly organize events. This already happens at headquarters level, 
but should be extended to project level. Attending events at their partner agency 
would allow the project managers to get to know the culture and the people, which 
in turn would make it easier to understand the interests, decision and approaches of 
their collaboration partners. 
Another option to learn about the partner’s culture is the exchange of staff. Project 
managers could work at the partner agency for a few months, where they will not 
only get to know the people and the culture but also learn about processes, tools 
and working methods. Back at their own agencies they can use this knowledge and 
network to strengthen the collaboration. 
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5.4	Further	Recommendations		
8. Agencies should aim at higher levels of collaboration: The analysis of the four 
cases shows that co-financing usually allows for better coordination of activities 
because all activities are harmonized within the framework of one single project. 
To achieve a collaboration which ranges from preparation over design to imple-
mentation of a project the agencies should in general target high levels of collabo-
ration such as co-financing or formal partnerships. “I think that in co-financing 
there would be really joint partnerships, jointly implementation of projects, equali-
ty, better chance on a multilateral approach.” (Interview 8) Moreover, the agencies 
should push the mutual recognition of their procedures in order to realize the high-
est level of collaboration, the delegation of funds. 
 
9. Greater involvement of the ministerial level: In order for the partnership to be-
come sustainable commitment from the ministerial level should be demonstrated. 
Backing and support from the ministries would make it easier for the agencies to 
reach a consensus and to enforce joint decisions. Representatives of the ministries 
could not only take part in the meetings of the three agencies, but the ministries of 
Germany, France and Luxembourg should also coordinate among themselves and 
come to an agreement regarding their strategies on the country and sector level. 
„The whole chain should be involved, including the ministries of Germany, Lux-
embourg and France. The higher the level where agreements begin, the easier the 
collaboration in the field would be.“ (Interview 5)  
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The collaboration of AFD, GIZ and LuxDev in TVET is the first formalized partnership of 
the three implementing agencies to close the gap between policy and practice regarding 
harmonization and coordination of implementing agencies in international development. In 
the 14 countries, where two or all three of the agencies are present, different levels of col-
laboration can be observed, ranging from information exchange to co-financed projects. 
The dimensions of the collaboration process are at the center of the analysis. The study 
identifies criteria for each of the three dimensions to assess the process of collaboration:  
1.  The structural dimension: Do joint governance aspects and the administrative 
structure of the collaboration support collaborative efforts? 
2. The agency dimension: Are individual and collective interests reconciled and does 
the structure of the agencies allow for collaboration? 
3. The social capital dimension: Do mutually beneficial interdependencies, trust and 
reciprocity exist? 
As explained in the problem analysis in chapter 4, there are different weaknesses and fields 
for improvement in each of the four selected cases.  
The co-financing of a program in Burkina Faso is characterized by joint decision-making, 
clear roles and responsibilities, formalized communication, willingness to share infor-
mation and to adopt common procedures, complementary interdependencies and social 
relationships based on trust and reciprocity. Some blocking factors remain in the structural 
dimension. Different visions and approaches on certain issues can block consensus build-
ing. Also, unequal power arrangements within the steering committee can lead to biased 
decisions. 
The collaboration in Kosovo is formalized through a MoU aiming at harmonizing and 
aligning donor activities under the leadership of the local ministry to avoid overlapping 
contributions. Criteria of the structural dimension, such as joint decision-making and regu-
lar communication, are fulfilled. However, collaboration efforts are severely blocked due 
to weaknesses in the agency and social capital dimensions. Different personal visions and 
opinions on fundamental questions, as well as different implementing mechanisms and 
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tools, hinder reciprocity and trust-building which negatively affects social relationships 
and the willingness to exchange information. 
In Vietnam, to avoid overlapping activities and investments in the same occupational pro-
files, the agencies agreed on a division of labor and the coordination of two separate pro-
jects to support a technical training center. Joint decision-making, clearly defined roles, 
coordination through meetings and information exchange as well as the commitment to 
collective goals have been identified as success factors of the collaboration. The problems 
that arise are of a structural nature. The lack of willingness from the government of Vi-
etnam to combine both projects blocks a more intensive collaboration. Thereby, even if the 
agencies follow a shared goal, they still design and implement their project in an autono-
mous way using their own procedures and implementation mechanisms. Also, a systematic 
and extensive exchange of information does not take place. 
In Togo the two agencies are at the beginning of a new project cycle, so they are jointly 
assessing and preparing a new program. The collaboration so far has been described as 
very positive. The agencies agreed on a direction of collective action following a joint vi-
sion. A joint steering committee will coordinate the design and implementation of joint 
activities. There are some external factors that are still unclear. The Togolese government 
could block the collaboration efforts. Also, the consulting firm commissioned to imple-
ment parts of the project will have to commit to the collective goals. 
A priority for the future is certainly to foster and extend the promising partnership of the 
three agencies and to solve the weaknesses that are blocking current collaboration efforts. 
As the success or failure of a collaborative alliance can often be attributed to its initial de-
sign, the agencies should avoid such barriers from the beginning when setting up new part-
nerships. 
Based on the three dimensions and the problem analysis, this study proposes a set of nine 
recommendations are expected to improve the collaboration of the three agencies. The 
most immediate and largest improvements should result from structural improvements. To 
address the structural blocking factors, the agencies should evaluate their collaboration 
efforts regularly and jointly to allow for timely feedback and improvements, create a coor-
dinating body to streamline different wishes and needs and facilitate discussion, and speak 
to the recipient country’s government with one voice to avoid different and confusing mes-
sages. To manage the tension between individual and collective interests, regular discus-
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sions with everyone involved to set the principles and develop a long term vision and 
knowledge about the tools, procedures and implementing mechanisms of the collaboration 
partners are crucial. To better meet the criteria of the social capital dimension, the agencies 
should appoint boundary-spanners to manage and build inter-organizational relationships 
and create opportunities to learn about their collaboration partners’ culture to build social 
relationships based on reciprocity and trust. Furthermore, the three agencies should not 
only promote further collaborative alliances in other countries and sectors, they should also 
strive to reach higher levels of collaboration, such as delegation of funds, in order to in-
crease the effects of the collaborative alliances. The analysis also shows that commitment 
from the ministerial level is crucial to build a long-term and sustainable partnership.  
This study provides the basis for further conceptualization and new questions that can be 
used as ideas for further research. One target for additional research is the causal process 
component. This thesis showed an approach for improving weaknesses of the four selected 
cases. Some suggestions have been given on why these problems emerged. There are how-
ever many opportunities for looking at the sequence of events in these cases and determin-
ing the causal process that leads to those outcomes. 
Finally, it is important to apply a broader policy perspective to collaboration in internation-
al development cooperation. If the agencies develop the partnership in the described direc-
tion, it has the potential to become a model for an initiative that contributes to overcoming 
the problem of fragmentation and proliferation of implementing agencies in the TVET sec-
tor. To address the gap between policy and country level practices  and to successfully 
translate the commitments made regarding more harmonized and collectively effective 
actions into significant changes on the ground comprehensive enforcement and implemen-
tation mechanisms and a change of mindset in the implementation of development aid are 
crucial. Therefore, it is important to move beyond a collaboration of three implementing 
agencies in one sector and to promote the exchange of information, common strategies, 
delegation of activities and joint design and implementation of projects between all players 
in international development, including ministries, United Nations agencies, NGOs, and 
community-based organizations to overcome the problems of donor fragmentation and 
proliferation to make development assistance more effective.  
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Appendix	A:	Questions	of	the	Online	Survey	
1. Please indicate the organization you work for. 
2. Please specify your position. 
3. In which country are you working? / In which country are the TVET (technical vo-
cational education and training) projects located you are managing or working on? 
4. Please specify the title of the technical vocational education and training project(s) 
you are managing or working on. 
5. Are you aware of some sort of cooperation between GIZ and/or AFD and/or 
LuxDev in the sector of technical vocational education and training in your coun-
try? 
6. What is the level of collaboration?  
- High level of cooperation (eg. cofinancing) 
- Intermediate level of cooperation (eg. formal partnership) 
- Cooperation at the implementing level (eg. joint missions) 
- Minimum level of cooperation (eg. information exchange) 
- No form of cooperation 
7. Please specify the elements of the cooperation. 
8. How do you perceive the cooperation? 
9. How do the government of the partner country and the institutions you are working 
with perceive the cooperation? 
10. In your opinion what are the main positive outcomes of this cooperation? 
11. Have you experienced or do you perceive any challenges since starting this cooper-
ation? 
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12. What have been the three main success factors for this cooperation?  
13. What have been the three main blocking factors for this cooperation? 
14. In your opinion, would a higher level of cooperation between the agencies be bene-
ficial to the project or program? 
15. Why/ Why not? 
16. How could the cooperation be improved? 
17. Is there anything you would like to add? 
18. I am hoping to conduct follow-up interviews with a sample of participants of this 
survey. Please indicate your contact information if you are willing to answer some 
of the questions raised in more detail via email or telephone.  
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Appendix	B:	Questionnaire	for	the	Semi‐Structured	Interviews	
Introduction: 
My name is Lisa-Marie Kreibich from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and I am 
a former intern at GIZ in the department of TVET. I am calling you as you had agreed to 
be interviewed today at this time. Before we begin, I want to thank you for participating in 
my study on inter-agency coordination.  
As you know my Master Thesis will analyze the prerequisites for a successful collaboration 
between GIZ, AFD and LuxDev and I want to use the collaboration in the TVET project 
in____ as a case study. 
 
1. The Project 
a. Can you remind me of the title of the project/program? 
b. What are the elements of the project? 
c. What is the role of each agency? 
 
2. The Elements of Collaboration 
a. How would you describe the level of collaboration between ___ and ____? 
- High level of cooperation (eg. cofinancing) 
- Intermediate level of cooperation (eg. formal partnership) 
- Cooperation at the implementing level (eg. joint missions) 
- Minimum level of cooperation (eg. information exchange) 
b. Please specify the elements of the collaboration. 
c. Are other donors/stakeholders involved? 
 
3. Purpose and Strategy 
a. Why and when did you enter into collaboration with ___?  
b. How did the collaboration evolve?  
Follow-up: 
c. Did your organization make any resource commitments for the collaboration? (in 
terms of budget, personnel) 
d. Do specific goals for the collaboration exist? 
e. Is senior leadership commitment demonstrated? 
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f. Is there a willingness to consider other organizations’ interests? 
 
4. Structure 
a. Does each organization have a clearly established role in the collaboration? 
b. Are there specific internal processes that enable effective collaboration? 
c. Does each organization respond to the requirements of the other organization? 
d. Do criteria and performance standards for evaluating inter-organizational efforts 
and outcomes exist? 
 
5. Communication 
a. How does communication work? Does someone fulfil a liaison role between the 
two organizations?  
b. Do interagency teams and task forces exist? 
 
6. Flexibility 
a. Do you think the partnership would be flexible enough to adapt if the requirements 
change? 
b. Is there a willingness and the possibility to adjust own procedures to facilitate col-
laboration? 
 
7. Individual collaborative work and capabilities 
a. Who is/Are you responsible for representing ___ in the collaboration in the field/in 
headquarters? 
b. Is individual collaborative work clearly structured in terms of clear goals, con-
straints, and authorities? 
Follow-up: 
c. Are employees rewarded for investing time in building collaborative relationships 
with other organization members and for successful collaborative results?  
d. Are collaborative talents and achievements considered when people are recruited or 
reviewed for promotion?  
e. Do the persons involved have the attitudes, skills, knowledge, and behaviour that 
improve the organization’s ability to collaborate?  
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8. Relationships 
a. How would you describe the social and professional relationships that organiza-
tional members have with counterparts in other organizations? 
b. Is there awareness and trust? 
 
9. Information Sharing 
a. Are technical mechanisms for collaboration used, information systems and collabo-
rative planning tools? 
b. Do the organization’s norms and values support information sharing? 
Follow-up: 
c. Do the other organizations have access to information relevant to their success in 
the collaborative activity? 
d. Do the persons involved have the opportunity to learn about the interests and capa-
bilities (and limitations) of the other organization? 
 
10. Outlook 
a. Can you think of other factors that could block developing and sustaining this co-
operation? 
b. In your opinion, what improvements should be made for the collaboration to work 
better? 
c. Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
Thank you again for your time and participation, I really appreciate your help. 
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Appendix	C:	Additional	Information	on	the	Agencies	
 AFD  GIZ  LuxDev  
Status  Development bank Implementing agency Implementing agency 
Instruments  Financial cooperation  Technical cooperation  Technical cooperation  
Clients  Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs 
(MAEE), 
Ministry of Economy, 
Finance and Employment 
(MINEFI)  
German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ), 
other federal ministries; 
multilateral agencies; 
other Governments  
Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (MAE)  
Staff  1,715 employees (2010)  17,296 employees (12,254 
national staff) (2010)  
641 employees (2012)  
Field offices  75 representations world-
wide  
90 country offices and 18 
offices across Germany 
6 regional representations  
Amount 
disbursed  
6.9 billions € (2011)  1.85 billion € (2010)  76.6 millions € (2011) 
Projects   Approximately 3,000 
projects (2010)  
14 projects in formulation,  
117 projects in execution 
(2012)  
Projects in 
TVET 
35 ongoing projects in 
TVET (2011) 
  
Geographical 
focus  
More than 60 developing 
countries in Africa, Asia, 
Mediterranean Basin, 
Middle East, South Amer-
ica, and French Overseas 
Territories  
More than 130 countries 
worldwide of which 50 are 
priority countries of BMZ 
(Asia, Southeastern Eu-
rope, Latin America, Mid-
dle East, Africa)  
10 privileged partner 
countries and 6 other 
countries 
Sources: Self-compiled based on AFD (2012), GIZ (2013), Lux-Development (2012), BMZ (2012) 
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Appendix	D:	Comparison	of	the	Project	Cycles	
Due to their different status the agencies are characterized by different project cycles and 
procedures. Nevertheless, clustering each of the different phases according to the categori-
zation of EuropeAid (2007) allows for meaningful comparison. The ODA project cycle 
starts with the programming phase which translates political and recipient country needs 
into strategic development objectives. In the design phase, based on these development 
objectives, program and project proposals are developed and decision on financial contri-
butions are made. In the implementation phase financing decision are translated into activi-
ties on the ground. Finally, during the evaluation phase, outputs and outcomes are re-
viewed for lessons learned and feedback.  
 
Comparison of the Project Cycles 
Sources: Self-compiled based on EuropeAid (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
